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Abstract 
Differences and trends in the discourse of memory in France have been consistent since the publication by 
Henri Bergson of Matter and Memory in 1896. In History, Memory, Forgetting published in 2000, Ricœur’s 
approach goes further than Bergson, Durkheim and Halbwachs. The memory issue in Ricœur is closely 
linked to a “hermeneutics of the self” that he already introduced in Oneself as Another in 1990. It seems that 
the traditional paradigm between individual and collective memory has been replaced by the necessary 
affirmation of the dialogical nature of memory related to the dialogical nature of the being as a self and as an 
other. 
Keywords: Memory, History, Forgetting, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics 
Résumé 
Les discussions autour de la question de la mémoire en France ont été nombreuses depuis la parution en 
1896 de Matière et Mémoire de Henri Bergson. Dans La Mémoire, l’histoire et l’oubli paru en 2000, l’approche de 
Ricœur semble aller plus loin que les précédentes tentatives de Bergson, Durkheim et Halbwachs. La 
question de la mémoire chez Ricœur est intimement liée à une “herméneutique du soi” introduite déjà en 
1990 dans Soi-même comme un autre. Il semblerait que le traditionnel paradigme entre mémoire individuelle 
et mémoire collective ait été remplacé par la nécessaire affirmation de la nature dialogique de la mémoire 
liée à la nature dialogique de l’être en tant que soi et en tant qu’autre. 
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Introduction 
Differences and trends in the discourse of memory in France have been consistent since 
the publication by Henri Bergson of Matter and Memory in 1896. In History, Memory and Forgetting 
published in 2000, Ricœur’s treatment of the question of memory goes further than Bergson, 
Durkheim or Halbwachs, and it is closely linked to the “hermeneutics of the self” that he already 
introduced in Oneself as Another in 1990. However, the heritage of this discourse of memory in 
France, since Bergson, is clearly present in the work of Ricœur, and it seems that, with him and 
through him, the discussion has come to a conclusion. The traditional paradigm of the relation 
between individual and collective memory has been replaced by the necessary affirmation of the 
dialogical nature of memory related to the dialogical nature of the human being as a self and as 
an other.  
The discourse on memory in France really gained importance with the publication in 
1896 of Matter and Memory by Henri Bergson (1859-1941), where he studied in particular the 
functions of the brain, and examined the relationship between perception and memory, as well as 
the problems in the relationship between mind and body. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) was of the 
same generation as Bergson and another prominent figure in the debate on memory that was 
going on in France in the late 19th century. In 1895, Durkheim wrote The Rules of Sociological 
Method, where he proposed a holistic view for the study of the social fact, refusing to study the 
psychological aspects of the individual. In 1898, he founded the journal L’Année sociologique, 
which would help to give a strong impetus to French sociology. A third important figure linked 
to the study of memory in France is Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a sociologist and disciple of 
Durkheim. Bergson’s influence on the work of Halbwachs would also be central, as I will show 
later. But it would be necessary to recognize a certain evolution in the work of Halbwachs. In The 
Social Framework of Memory (1925), he first demonstrates how the memory is activated by the 
context, or the socio-cultural framework in which the individual operates. His study of memory 
in the context of the family would especially have an influence on oral history. In La topographie 
légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte: Étude de Mémoire Collective (1941), he emphasizes the aspect 
of localizable memory, giving birth to the concept of “lieux de mémoire”/“realms of memory” 
that would later influence historians of The Annales School of Thought, such as Jacques Le Goff and 
Pierre Nora. Paul Ricœur, with History, Memory, Forgetting published in 2000, draws a broad 
panorama of the discourse on history and memory by providing an overview of the subject since 
Antiquity, but also by integrating the fundamental question of forgetting. Forgetting and 
memory in Ricœur are like two sides of the same coin. In this respect, the words of Ricœur are 
unequivocal: 
I remain troubled by the disturbing spectacle that gives too much memory here, too much 
forgetting elsewhere, to say nothing of the influence of commemorations and abuses of 
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memory – and forgetting. The idea of a fair politics of memory is, in this regard, one of my 
confessed civic themes.1  
I should also add that the subject of memory, commemoration and forgetting has been 
very much discussed in France since the establishment in 2008 of a parliamentary commission of 
information on memorial issues. This commission had to clarify the questions of “too much 
memory,” on the one hand, and “too much forgetting” on the other, but the commission also had 
to rule on the role of the political in the historical discourse, particularly related to the question of 
the history curriculum at school. 
 This commission of information emerged in a context of “rebellion” among a number 
of French historians, including Pierre Nora, Henry Rousso, François Dosse, who since the 1990s 
were facing the implementation of a consistent number of laws in France which, according to 
them, have had adverse effects on the flexibility of the work of historians.2 The European 
Framework Decision of the 19th and 20th of April 2007, which introduced among other things a 
“crime of trivialization” of all war crimes and crimes against humanity, has also provoked strong 
reactions in France, Italy, Belgium and England. The question of the relationship between history 
and memory, and the problems that the judgment of the past from a present perspective and 
from a political institution may introduce, have been and are still central to these discussions.  
The Discourse of the Scholars of Antiquity: Aristotle and Plato 
The discourse on the relationship between memory and history is not new. The influence 
of Aristotle on the memorial discourse in France in the late 19th century was inevitable. For 
Aristotle, the imagination is a necessary condition for remembering and reminiscing. This led 
Aristotle, in Poetics, to conclude that the poets’ depiction of reality lay closer to the truth than that 
of the historians. Aristotle does not consider that there is a clear distinction between past and 
present. The subject of the memory necessarily belongs to the past while the perception of it 
belongs to the immediate present: 
Memory is, therefore, neither perception nor conception, but a state or affection of one of 
these, conditioned by a lapse of time. As already observed, there is no such thing as 
memory of the present while present, for the present is the object only of perception, and 
the future, of expectation, but the object of memory is the past.3  
Time as cumulative and memory as a process going from an affectation in the past to a 
perception in the present are central issues in Aristotle. In contrast, the past-present relation in 
Plato is defined as an aporia, which is a kind of “non-sense.” The aporia persists in Plato, since he 
perceives the purpose of memory as to remember a “non-object,” in other words, to make present 
an object that does not exist any longer. This difference between the “has been” in Aristotle and 
the “no longer” in Plato is fundamental in all discussions on the issue of memory up to today. 
 In this context Aristotle speaks about two kinds of relation between affection and 
perception. He makes a distinction between mneme which is a memory that occurs unexpectedly 
and is caused by external stimuli and anamnesis, which is an active and voluntary process of 
rediscovery of the past. The mental image produced by the memory, according to Aristotle, is 
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process due to the lapse of time, which separates the object/the event itself from the reception or 
the perception of the object/the event in a more or less distant future. 
 There is a distinction between the representation of memory and the writing of 
history. The main difference lies, not so much in the final product, as in the process of 
rediscovery, that is to say, in the hunt for the past. Historians are bound to base their work on 
known or established historical facts or on official sources, at the same time as they are obliged to 
document, or prove, their findings. To a much greater extent, the representation and the 
perception of memory integrates an emotional and pictorial dimension. History tries to organize 
knowledge about the past and to structure time into various periods, whereas memory is a 
continuous phenomenon: memories exist insofar as they are still alive in the mind of the narrator. 
Memories are perceptible: they affect our emotions, our ways of thinking, our actions and our 
interactions with others.4 
The Variability of Memory in Bergson, Durkheim and Halbwachs 
For many philosophers who were opposed to the objective positivism of the late 19th 
century, the mental image produced by the memorial process could only be the result of a 
subjective process in which time and perception play a major role. For Bergson as for Durkheim, 
subjectivism is the only valid answer, the only source of philosophical truth related to the 
experience of time. This consideration would have a major influence on a writer such as Proust 
through his work on In Search of Lost Time (earlier translated as Remembrance of Things Past) where 
the experience of the past and the memory is generally described as involuntary. The most 
famous experience of involuntary memory is known as “the episode of the madeleine” in Swann’s 
Way from 1913: 
She sent out for one of those short, plump little cakes called petites madeleines, which 
look as though they had been moulded in the fluted scallop of a pilgrim's shell. And soon, 
mechanically, weary after a dull day with the prospect of a depressing morrow, I raised to 
my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the cake. No sooner had 
the warm liquid, and the crumbs with it, touched my palate than a shudder ran through 
my whole body, and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that were taking 
place…at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters 
innocuous, its brevity illusory…5  
As Deleuze recalls, Bergson is not one of those philosophers for whom the pursuit of philosophy 
is related to the search for wisdom or a proper human balance. In Bergson, there is a genuine 
willingness to consider the human condition as “poorly analyzed” and philosophy as a 
“necessary effort to overcome his own human condition.”6 Time is for Bergson synonymous with 
duration. This means that time is pure movement, ceaseless change and process because the 
human consciousness is fundamentally directed towards action.7  
 The central difference between Bergson and Durkheim is that, according to Bergson, 
the variability of memory is linked to the subjective reception of the material by the body in 
which perception and affection play a central role. However, in Durkheim subjectivity is mostly 
related to the variability of the relation that the structure or the social relationship maintains with 
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time and duration.  Durkheim stated his point of view very clearly in The Rules of the Sociological 
Method, where he divided psychology and sociology into two clearly separated areas: 
*…+ *The+ new phenomena that arise in society are by definition different from those 
which occur in the solitary consciousness; we have to recognize that these specific facts 
reside in the society which produces them, not in its parts, that is to say its members. They 
are therefore, in this sense, external to the individual consciousness, considered as such.8  
In this respect, collective memory in Durkheim cannot be dependent on the individual 
consciousness; it has a life of its own. Conversely, for Bergson, memory is a central element of life 
in both psychology and sociology, not just an interesting aspect of the social structure. 
 This concept of the variability of memory linked to time would also be essential in 
Halbwachs, who would very easily recognize himself in the theses of Durkheim. It should be 
mentioned that he would himself become Durkheim’s student at the “Ecole Normale Supérieure” 
from 1898 to 1901. In the beginning Halbwachs would clearly steer away from the Bergsonian 
approach, which would lead him to write The Social Framework of Memory. In this book he tries to 
establish a typology of memory by identifying specific types of memory depending on the social 
context and time in which they could emerge. In this respect, he particularly studied the 
collective memory related to the family, the social class and the religious community. When it 
comes to the family, he stated, among other things, that the expression of feelings within the 
family is always the result of family structure, and that this is the condition for preserving 
cohesion within the family. To prove the structural dependence of memory, Halbwachs contends 
that the child’s upbringing and development of his or her personality is dependent on the 
parents’ view on their own children, even during adulthood. According to Halbwachs, it is the 
structure to which we belong, “the other from the outside,” which works as a stimulus and gives 
us the opportunity to remember: 
When we meet a friend that we haven’t seen for a very long time, we have some difficulty, 
at first, talking to him. But soon, when we have discussed a whole variety of 
circumstances that each of us remembers and which are not the same although they relate 
to the same events, we become able to think and to remember together. The facts from the 
past become more important, we relive it more forcibly, because we are not representing it 
alone, and because we see it now, as we have seen it previously, when we looked through 
our eyes, and at the same time through the eyes of another.9  
However, Halbwachs disagrees with Durkheim for whom there is a social consciousness outside 
and totally independent of the individual consciousness. It is at this point that Halbwachs 
distances himself from Durkheim. He asserts that the collective memory cannot be created 
without the influence of the social context, but he does not accept the fact that collective memory 
has an independent life from the individual consciousness. Collective memory in Halbwachs is 
necessarily plural and not unitary. This point is crucial because, I believe, it has led to many 
misunderstandings of Halbwachs’ work. 
As previously mentioned, the group functions as a stimulus in Halbwachs, but the 
interdependence between the individual and the collective memory is not rejected. Therefore, this 
brings him much closer to the thesis of Bergson. At this level an evolution in the theories of 
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Collective Memory in 1950. In On Collective Memory, it is no longer just a question of a sociological 
study of memory; there is rather a clear affirmation of the ontological and internal dimension of 
the memorial phenomenon: 
Our memories remain collective, and they are remembered by others, even though it is 
events in which we have been involved alone, and even though it is objects that we have 
seen only by ourselves. The reality is that we are never alone. It is not necessary that other 
people who differ materially from us are there, because we always bring with us and 
always bear in us a lot of people.10 
This affirmation of an interdependence and interaction between the inner and the outer is in 
many ways similar to what Bergson asserts in Creative Evolution (1907) when he says that the 
individual experience is never singular, but always collective because it necessarily happens in 
relation with others.11 Ricœur, who argues that the relationship to history is always shaped with a 
triple attribution to the self, relatives and others, also shares this point of view: 
We would say that each individual memory is a particular point of view on the collective 
memory, that the view changes according to the place I occupy and that the place itself 
changes according to the relationship I have with other environments.12  
In this sense, I cannot agree with Ricœur when he claims that Halbwachs goes too far by 
crossing the line between “we can’t remember alone” to “we are not genuine owners of our 
memories.” I believe that the thesis of Halbwachs is, in many ways, similar to Ricœur’s 
affirmation, and we can still wonder why Ricœur is not according much more interest to 
Halbwachs’ work. But Ricœur’s approach goes further than Bergson or Halbwachs by the fact 
that it is closely linked to a “hermeneutics of the self” that Ricœur introduces in Oneself as Another 
(1990). In this work he seeks both the recognition of a plurality and an otherness within the same 
individual. The other is not just an external element, but also a constitutive element of the being.   
The starting point of Ricœur’s “hermeneutics of the self” is to consider a difference 
between the “I” and the “self.” The “I” of the human being, or what he calls “sameness” or “idem-
identity,”13  is the constitutive and deep characteristic of the human being. It is the part of the 
individual that does not change and that makes it possible to recognize him/her. The “self” which 
is related to “ipséité” or “ipse-identity" is the part of the individual who is subject to change and 
contains an element of otherness. In Ricœur otherness is not only an element of comparison but 
also an element of involvement, not only an element from the outside, but also from the inside of 
the being. 
Being able to talk about the other as an outside person (or what Ricœur called “le 
particulier de base”14), but also as a part of the self, is one of the central elements of the rhetoric in 
Ricœur and becomes a very important element when we consider the issue of memory. I believe 
this perspective of the “I” and the “self” contributes to a shift in the debate over the controversy 
between individual and collective memory, from an individual and collective perspective to a 
dialogical perspective, from a perspective of comparison to a perspective of involvement. The 
dialogical perspective in Ricœur is also an “inside perspective”, not only an “in between 
perspective,” situating Ricœur in the heritage of Bakhtin’s dialogism.15   
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Ricœur towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting 
Links between Bergson and Ricœur become explicit in Ricœur’s Memory, History, 
Forgetting, in which he fully acknowledges the legacy of Bergson’s work and, in particular, in the 
chapter related to “Forgetting and the Persistence of Traces.”16 There is in Bergson and Ricœur a 
strong and clear position on what could be called a phenomenology of time. In other words, our 
conscious life is in a perpetual oscillation between the dynamics of retention and protention. In 
that way, the phenomenology of time allows us to explore the meaning of our past intimately 
associated with an enhanced understanding of the future. 
The discourse on memory in Ricœur is obviously highly influenced by the positions of 
Husserl. In Ricœur, the past is also considered as a “having been” and not only as a “being no 
longer,”17 thus recalling the words of Michel de Certeau for whom “deaths are absent from 
history, but these beings who are no longer are also beings who have been.”18 In other words, 
there is the need to consider the legacy of the past in duration, which is cumulative, and which 
we have in us more or less consciously. Thus, even the forgotten event is a part of our personal 
time, since the fact that it has been forgotten does not mean that it has not existed or does not 
exist anymore. 
Ricœur disagrees here with Bergson, for whom forgetting is in reality a complete logic of 
deletion: 
All the facts and all analogies are in favor of a theory that would consider the brain as an 
intermediary object between the sensations and movements, which would make of this set 
of sensations and movements the tip of mental life, continuously inserted into the events. 
By giving to the body the only function of guiding the real memory and of connecting it to 
the present, it will define the memory as absolutely independent of matter. In this way the 
brain helps to recall the useful memories, but even more to exclude all others.19  
For Ricœur, forgetting has the ability to become a timeless resource and is not to be considered 
just as a deletion.20 Ricœur considers forgetting as a possible world of expectation, or what he 
calls “the reserve of forgetting.”21 This paradigm of forgetting as both a “reserve” and “deletion” 
is at the origin of what Ricœur calls “the alarming threat which is at the back-plane of the 
phenomenology of memory and epistemology of history.”22 But at the same time, Ricœur 
considers the problem of the reliability of memory, of the veracity of history, and the problem 
that memory could shape on the existence of the self and on the coexistence with others. 
The real question in Memory, History, Forgetting is a matter of ontological nature. Indeed, 
if in Time and Narrative, Ricœur poses the question of the past as an enigma that cannot only be 
met by the gaze of the historian, but that needs to be rebuilt or retold, the central problem in 
Memory, History, Forgetting is linked to the question of the truth about the nature of the human 
being as a part of a dialogical or multi-directional process where the “myself-for-myself,” the 
“myself-for-the-other,” and the “other-for-myself” are in perpetual interaction.  
In this sense, it is through both the paradigm of the question of forgetting and through 
the concept of the ipse, that Ricœur, in Memory, History, Forgetting, shifts the paradigm raised in 
particular by the debate between Bergson and Halbwachs, between individual and collective 
memory. The central issue is no longer whether to discuss the origin or the structure of memory 
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the risks that forgetting may cause for the many and complex relations between the self and the 
other and thus the necessary work of memory (the Aristotelian anamnesis) into forgetting as a 
reserve. According to Ricœur, the individual and the collective, the private and the social, the 
inner and the outer, all interact with each other and might lead to the possible “extension of 
personal expectations.”23 
From this consideration emerges the necessary development of what might be called an 
“ethics of memory” which would include the concept of “work of memory” as a process and the 
concept of “forgiveness” as an ultimate goal. 
According to the subject of the “work of memory,” Ricœur states clearly that the concept 
of the “has-been” makes it possible to consider forgetting as an available resource for the work of 
memory.24 This implies the negation of the ethical neutralization and the opening of the past to a 
consideration that is not necessarily historiographic. As such, for example, Ricœur points out in 
Time and Narratives the inconceivable ethical neutralization when we talk about Auschwitz, 
indicating at the same time that sometimes it requires an ethical position, which is not neutral. 
Thus Ricœur does not contest the “duty of memory,” as he has sometimes been criticized for. 
Instead, he claims the absolute need to join the “duty of memory” and the “work of memory,” 
thus saving the “has been” from the risk of becoming the “no longer.” Ricœur reaffirms therefore 
the central role of the historian, in addition to the need to open historiography to other forms of 
narratives, such as memorial testimony, for example. 
The opening of the study of memory to the truth of the nature of the human being also 
leads to the notion of “forgiveness.” According to Ricœur, forgiveness can only be practiced and 
revealed individually and directly from victim to perpetrator. Forgiveness can be considered as 
an active and voluntary oversight, in other words as an ethical use of forgetting. Agreeing in this 
with Derrida, who argues that forgiveness should be neither normal nor normative nor 
normalizing but has to be maintained as exceptional,25 Ricœur also strongly condemned the 
institutionalization of forgiveness or the political use of forgiveness in the example of amnesty 
granted by a state that requires the suppression of the fundamental right to remember.26  
“Forgiveness” in Ricœur has to be closely related to the broader concept of “debt.” In this 
sense, “being-in-debt” in Ricœur is opposed to “being-for-death” in Heidegger. According to 
Hannah Arendt, erasing the debt leads to an active erasure that leads to the impossibility of 
“continuing the action” or of overcoming our own human condition, to use the words of Bergson. 
In that way, the relationship between memory and history is reversed. Like historians such as 
Pierre Nora and Henry Rousso, Ricœur recommends considering history from the present, which 
would enable a reflection on the event between experience and the horizon of expectation.27  
Conclusion  
Ricœur’s work, especially Memory, History, Forgetting, can be considered an integral part 
of the discourse on memory in France which started with Bergson and Matter and Memory in 1896. 
There are many more commonalities between Bergson, Halbwachs and Ricœur than Memory, 
History, Forgetting leads us to believe. The relations we have established here between Bergon’s 
Creative Evolution (1907), which is a main reference in Ricœur, and Halbwachs’ On Collective 
Memory (1950) lead us to a new perception of their understanding of the individual and the 
collectivity to which they all refer. It is never a question of a unitary collectivity from which the 
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individual disappears, but a dialogical collectivity in which the individual plays an active part. 
Memories are always shaped in relation to others. In fact, the traditional paradigm of individual 
and collective memory may even lead to a non-sense, since the nature of memory is dialogical. 
Even though Ricœur, Halbwachs and Bergson clearly introduce a dialogical relation between the 
individual and the collective, Ricœur goes further in developing a dialogical dimension within 
the self. In Halbwachs, otherness was present in the self, but it was considered as the other-from-
the-outside, whereas in Ricœur otherness comes not only from the outside but also from within.  
In order to understand the past better and in order to make the past a real resource for 
new experiences and future expectations, it is necessary to consider the dialogical nature of 
memory. Memories are dialogical not only because of their narrative structure but also because of 
their ontological nature. This leads us to consider the polyphonic nature of the truth, present both 
in the search of the truth but also in the telling of the truth. That is not to say that there is no 
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